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Abstract
This paper gives an explication of our intuitive notion of strength
of justification in a controversial debate. It defines a thesis’ degree of
justification within the bipolar argumentation framework of the theory
of dialectical structures as the ratio of coherently adoptable positions
according to which that thesis is true over all coherently adoptable
positions. Broadening this definition, the notion of conditional degree
of justification, i.e. degree of partial entailment, is introduced. Thus
defined degrees of justification correspond to our pre-theoretic intu-
itions in the sense that supporting and defending a thesis t increases,
whereas attacking it decreases, t’s degree of justification. Moreover,
it is shown that (conditional) degrees of justification are (conditional)
probabilities. Eventually, the paper explains that it is rational to be-
lieve theses with a high degree of justification insofar as this strength-
ens the robustness of one’s position.
1 Introduction
Imagine two opponents discussing whether some claim is true or not. They
put forward different arguments: fortifying their own lines of reasoning,
attacking their opponent’s arguments, introducing counter-arguments, etc.
Once the exchange of reasons has come to an end, one might ask which of
two controversial claims is more strongly justified. This seems to be a sensi-
ble question. It isn’t, moreover, patently absurd to picture that some thesis
is better justified than a second one, which in turn is better justified than a
third one, suggesting that our intuitive notion of strength of justification is
a comparative concept.
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Three examples, taken from three different debates, namely about the
reality global warming, scientific relativism and British foreign policy, shall
carve out the vague idea that justification comes in degrees. The following list
contains three central claims, A, B and C, taken from each of these debates,
which can be intuitively ordered according to their respective strength of
justification: A is better justified than B, and B is better justified than C.
The reality of global warming1:
(A) Ongoing climate change is partially man-made.
(B) As a consequence of global warming, the Greenland ice sheet will melt in
the course of the next centuries.
(C) There is no significant human influence on the global climate system.
Scientific relativism:
(A) Scientific theories work, i.e. enable us to control and manipulate nature.
(B) Scientific theories become ever more empirically adequate, accumulating the
success of previous theories.
(C) Scientific theories are approximately true, and converge against the true
description of nature.
British foreign policy:
(A) Britain should stay in the European Union.
(B) Britain should adopt the single European currency.
(C) Britain should give up its permanent seat in the security council.
Yet why would one judge that climate change being partially man made
is better justified than the prediction that Greenland will ultimately melt?
Why is the advice to stay in the EU better justified than the one to join
the Euro? These questions do not ask for specific arguments that warrant
the respective statements; they inquire generally as to the features of the
corresponding debates which are responsible for our judgement regarding
the strength of justification.
One way to approach the idea which underlies this paper’s attempt to give
a precise explication of the notion of degree of justification consists in turning
these questions upside down. Instead of “Is t well justified?” consider the
question “Given the debate with its inferential relations, what would have
to be the case such that t were false?”! The fewer ‘possibilities’ we can
1Compare for example Rahmstorf and Schellnhuber (2006).
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envisage such that t becomes false, the better justified is the thesis t. Yet
what are these ‘possibilities’? We may think of them, I suggest, as positions
one can coherently adopt in the debate. Thence, if t is true from almost every
coherent position one can embrace in a debate, t is well justified, whereas if
t is only true from a very specific perspective, then t is not so well justified.
Furthermore, t1 is better justified than t2 if t1 is false in fewer coherent
positions than t2. Returning to the examples, “Scientific theories work” is
better justified than “Scientific theories are approximately true” because the
former statement will be true in most coherent positions in the philosophy of
science controversy, whereas the latter is true only from a few specific (e.g.
realist) perspectives.
A formal explication of our pre-theoretic notion of strength of justifica-
tion proves its worth by capturing and systematising our intuitions and our
argumentative practice. This is, however, not to say that these intuitions are
infallible. A theoretic concept of degree of justification which successfully
represents many of our intuitions, thus explaining current discursive prac-
tice, is not necessarily falsified when in contradiction with other intuitions.
On the contrary, these might be rectified in the light of the theoretic findings.
Having outlined the basic idea underlying this paper, I shall, next, briefly
comment on how the concrete implementation of that very idea within the
theory of dialectical structures relates to existing approaches in the literature.
The comparative notion of justification can be caught in an argumentation
theory which accommodates multiple degrees of justification, and degrees of
belief, e.g. Pollock’s theory of defeasible reasoning with variable degrees of
belief (Pollock, 2001).2 One possible starting point for developing such a
many-value evaluation procedure are subjective probabilities. “Probabilistic
argumentation frameworks” have been proposed, for instance, by Laskey
and Lehner (1989), Haenni et al. (2000), Haenni and Lehmann (2003), or
Kohlas (2003). Betz (2008) is an attempt to apply subjective probabilities to
evaluate dialectical structures. All these approaches commonly assume that
belief comes in degree, and that is what enables them to represent degrees
of justification. This paper, in contrast, tries to accommodate a quantitative
notion of degree of justification within a bivalence framework. In order to do
so, it builds on the (basic concepts of the) theory of dialectical structures as
developed by Betz (2009).3
2The approach presented in this paper, however, rejects a major principle of Pollock’s
theory, namely the weakest link principle.
3A dialectical structures is a special type of bipolar argumentation framework as de-
veloped by Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex (2005). Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex extend the
abstract approach of Dung (1995) by adding support-relations to Dung’s framework which
originally considered attack-relations between arguments only. A specific interpretation
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The subject matter of a theory of dialectical structures are debates. De-
bates consist of arguments and theses which can be reconstructed as premiss-
conclusion structures.4 Moreover, it is assumed that arguments are recon-
structed as deductively valid. The set of reconstructed arguments and theses
is labelled T .5 An argument a1 ∈ T supports (attacks) an argument a2 ∈ T if
and only if the conclusion of a1, briefly: C(a1), is equivalent (contradictory)
to a premiss of a2. The support- and attack-relation, U and A respectively,
that are thus defined on T make up the dialectical structure of the debate
τ = 〈T,A, U〉.6
A two-coloured, directed graph is an appropriate mathematical model of a
dialectical structure, and a helpful visualisation, too. Accordingly, arguments
are the graph’s nodes; a green (red) arrow between two arguments signifies
that one supports (attacks) the other. While using the colour-terminology for
convenience, I will visualise these two relations as curly and straight arrows,
i.e. A(a, b) ⇐⇒ a b and U(a, b) ⇐⇒ a→b.
The general idea sketched in this introduction will be unfolded in the
next two sections. Section 2 introduces the key concept of a coherent po-
sition a proponent can rationally adopt in a dialectical structure. Building
on this notion, section 3 defines the degree of justification, as well as related
concepts such as the conditional degree of justification and the degree of par-
tial entailment. Section 4 proves basic properties of degrees of justification,
demonstrating that the concept, as it has been defined, dovetails well with
our pre-theoretic intuitions. The mathematical structure of degrees of justifi-
cation is further elucidated by showing, in section 5, that degrees of justifica-
tion are probabilities, and that degrees of partial entailment are conditional
of Dung’s abstract framework that analyses arguments as premiss-conclusion structures is
carried out in Bondarenko et al. (1997).
4For the reconstruction of natural language arguments, in particular philosophical ones,
compare Tetens (2004).
5Note that, unlike in approaches by Lin and Shoham (1989) or the interpretation by
Prakken and Vreeswijk (2001, p 256) of Dung (1995), T is not supposed to contain ar-
guments which can be constructed given the propositions put forward in a debate (or,
more generally, some INPUT) but only those arguments that have been explicitly stated
(though not necessarily fully). This emphasis on real reasoning as opposed to ideal rea-
soning seems to be more in line with the approaches of Pollock (1987, 1995), Vreeswijk
(1997), or Verheij (1996).
6Accordingly, if two arguments conflict, i.e. possess contrary conclusions, they do not
necessarily attack each other as defined here. The “assumption attack” as well as “un-
dercutting” an argument (cf. Pollock, 1970; Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2001) can both be
represented in this framework as an attack on an argument’s premiss. Moreover, indi-
rect attacks, i.e. attacks on an argument’s subconclusion c−, can be made explicit by
reconstructing the attacked argument as two arguments, a1 and a2, such that c− is the
conclusion of a1 and a premiss of a2, a1 supporting a2 and a2 being the argument attacked.
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probabilities. The degree of justification is related to other concepts of the
theory of dialectical structures, in particular the notion of τ -deducibility, in
section 6. This results in distinguishing two notions of dialectical entailment.
Eventually, section 7 discusses whether there is a gap between rational belief
on the one hand, and beliefs with high degree of justification on the other
hand. It suggests that it is rational to believe a thesis with high degree
of justification insofar as one aims at maximising the robustness of one’s
position.
2 Coherent positions in dialectical structures
In the light of what has been said so far, defining the degree of justification
requires first and foremost to explicate the notion of a position which can (i)
be coherently adopted in a debate and according to which (ii) some thesis
is true. Betz (2009) proposed to identify coherent positions in dialectical
structures with closed and complete subdebates in equilibrium. This paper,
however, develops an alternative notion of a coherent position which is based
on evaluating sentences rather than entire arguments. Appendix A will re-
late these alternative concepts to each other, demonstrating that for every
sentence-based coherent position there is a corresponding closed, complete
subdebate in equilibrium, and vice versa.
This said, we can define a position on some dialectical structure τ as a
truth value assignment to the sentences which figure in arguments and theses
in τ .
Definition 1 (Complete position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical struc-
ture and S be the sentences occurring in τ . A truth value assignment Q :
S → {t, f} is called a complete position on τ .
A partial position does not necessarily assign truth values to all sentences
in τ .
Definition 2 (Partial position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical struc-
ture and S be the sentences occurring in τ . A truth value assignment P :
S ′ → {t, f} with S ′ ⊆ S is called a partial position on τ .
Let N denote the empty position (S ′ = ∅) which assigns no truth value
to any sentence.
Note that a complete position is, according to this definition, a partial
position, too. A partial position on some dialectical structure can extend
another partial position.
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Definition 3 (Extension of a partial position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a
dialectical structure, S be the sentences occurring in τ , and S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ S. A
partial position P2 : S2 → {t, f} extends a partial position P1 : S1 → {t, f}
if and only if P2(p) = P1(p) for all p ∈ S1. P2 is called an extension of P1.
Moreover, partial positions, provided they don’t assign different truth
values to the very same sentence, can be combined so as to give rise to a new
(partial) position.
Definition 4 (Union of positions) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical struc-
ture, S be the sentences occurring in τ , and P1 : S1 → {t, f}, P2 : S2 → {t, f}
represent two partial positions on τ which agree on S1 ∩ S2. The union of
these two positions, (P1&P2) : S1 ∪ S2 → {t, f}, assigns every sentence a
truth value as follows,
p 7→
{ P1(p) if p ∈ S1
P2(p) if p ∈ S2 \ S1 .
A dialectical structure encodes logical and inferential relations between
the sentences its arguments are composed of: Some of these sentence are con-
tradictory or equivalent—which gives rise to dialectical relations (i.e. support
and attack) between the arguments—, moreover, some sentences imply oth-
ers, namely insofar as they occur as premisses and conclusion in an individual
argument. These relations impose certain constraints on what positions can
be reasonably adopted given a dialectical structure τ . E.g., it would clearly
be irrational to consider all the premisses of an argument true, and its con-
clusion false.7 The following definition of a dialectically coherent position
summarises the conditions a position must satisfy in order to be reasonably
adoptable given the logical constraints encoded in τ .
Definition 5 (Coherent complete position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a di-
alectical structure and S be the sentences occurring in τ . A complete position
Q on τ is dialectically coherent if and only if
1. Q assigns identical truth values to equivalent sentences in S,
2. Q assigns complementary truth values to contradictory sentences in S,
and
3. every argument (p1, . . . , pn; c) ∈ T with true premisses, Q(p1) = . . . =
Q(pn) = t, has a true conclusion, Q(c) = t.
7Recall that we assume arguments to be reconstructed as deductively valid.
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Besides the logical constraints encoded in a dialectical structure, positions
might have to satisfy additional conditions imposed by a body of background
knowledge. Representing background knowledge as a partial position on τ ,
we can define
Definition 6 (Conditionally coherent complete position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉
be a dialectical structure and B be a partial position on τ . A complete position
Q on τ is dialectically coherent conditional to B if and only if
1. Q is dialectically coherent on τ , and
2. Q extends B.
Can these definitions be generalised so that they apply to partial posi-
tions, too? As a first attempt, one could simply require that a partial position
had to satisfy the corresponding criteria with respect to those sentences to
which it assigns truth values. That, however, would be inappropriate, as the
following example shows.
Example 1
a1 :
p1
p2
c





a2 :
p3
p4
p1
oo
t :
c
Consider the partial position P :
c p2 p3 p4
P f t t t
With a view to {c, p2, p3, p4}, P satisfies the three conditions of dialectical
coherence. Still, something is wrong with P : Although it does not assign a
truth value to p1, a proponent adopting P is committed to p1, because she
accepts the premisses of a2. However, this conflicts with her view that p2,
the second premiss of a1, is also true whereas the conclusion of a1, c, is false.
Examples of this type motivate the following definition.
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Definition 7 (Coherent partial position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialec-
tical structure. A partial position P on τ is dialectically coherent if and only
if there is a dialectically coherent complete position Q on τ which extends P.
P is dialectically coherent conditional to some partial position B iff there
is a complete extension of P that is dialectically coherent conditional to B.
We may now introduce two further concepts of which we will make use
in section 5.
Definition 8 (τ-certain partial position) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialec-
tical structure. A partial position P is called “τ -certain” if and only if it is
extended by every coherent and complete position on τ .
Definition 9 (τ-exclusive of a partial positions) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a
dialectical structure. Two partial positions P1 and P2 are called “τ -exclusive”
if and only if there is no coherent and complete position on τ which extends
both P1 and P2.
Let us eventually note some properties of coherent positions before we
use that very concept to define degrees of justification in the next section.
1. Whether a partial position P is coherent or not depends on τ , in par-
ticular on the arguments in τ which impose coherence constraints (def-
inition 5) on P .
2. A partial position which is coherent on some τ might become incoherent
if τ is extended by introducing additional arguments.
3. Dialectical incoherence, though, is monotonic in the sense that a partial
position which is incoherent on τ will be incoherent on every dialectical
structure that is obtained by introducing further arguments into τ .
4. Every partial position which is not dialectically coherent on some τ is
logically inconsistent.
5. The reverse, however, is not true. Let τ be a dialectical structure.
A partial position which is logically inconsistent is not necessarily di-
alectically incoherent on τ . This is because the logical relations that
hold between the debate’s sentences and which are responsible for the
logical inconsistency are not necessarily made explicit as arguments in
the dialectical structure; yet, only those inferential relations between
sentences which are represented as arguments in τ are taken into ac-
count when evaluating a position for dialectical coherency. Considering
8
but the inferential relations that have been ‘discovered’ so far at a cer-
tain state of a debate, dialectical evaluation is an evaluation of real as
opposed to ideal reasoning.
6. Once a partial position P which is dialectically coherent on τ is shown
to be logically inconsistent, τ can be extended by adding further argu-
ments (and without introducing new sentences) to τ ′ so that P becomes
dialectically incoherent on τ ′.
Observation 3 gives directly rise to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Coherent positions in expanded dialectical structures)
Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 and τ ′ = 〈T ′, A′, U ′〉 be two dialectical structures with
T ⊂ T ′ and A = A′|T , U = U ′|T . Every dialectically coherent, complete
position on τ ′ extends a dialectically coherent, complete position on τ .
3 The degree of justification
The preliminary analysis in the introduction suggested that the degree of
justification of some thesis depends on whether it is true according to most
positions one can reasonably adopt, or whether it is true only from very few,
specific points of view. With the notion of a coherent position in a dialectical
structure at hand, we can capture that general idea in the following definition.
Definition 10 (Degree of justification) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical
structure and P be a partial position on τ . The degree of justification of P
in τ is
Jτ (P) = σP
σ
,
where σ is the number of all dialectically coherent, complete positions on τ
and σP is the number of those dialectically coherent, complete positions which
extend P.
The degree of justification of a single sentence p in τ , Jτ (p), equals the de-
gree of justification of the corresponding partial position which merely assigns
p the truth value t.
Let us, as an illustration, calculate the degree of justification of the sen-
tence c in example 1. First of all, this requires to identify all dialectically
coherent, complete positions on τ . There exist altogether 25 different com-
plete positions on τ . Not all of them are dialectically coherent. If c is true,
p1 and p2 can take any truth value. However, if c is false, at least one of a1’s
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c p1 p2 p3 p4
P1 t t t t t
P2 t t t t f
P3 t t t f t
P4 t t t f f
P5 t t f t t
P6 t t f t f
P7 t t f f t
P8 t t f f f
P9 t f t t f
P10 t f t f t
P11 t f t f f
P12 t f f t f
P13 t f f f t
P14 t f f f f
P15 f t f t t
P16 f t f t f
P17 f t f f t
P18 f t f f f
P19 f f t t f
P20 f f t f t
P21 f f t f f
P22 f f f t f
P23 f f f f t
P24 f f f f f
Table 1: Dialectically coherent, complete positions in example 1.
premisses must be false, too. A similar reasoning applies to argument a2. Ta-
ble 1 lists those positions which satisfy the coherence constraints (definition
5).
14 of these 24 coherent positions assign c the truth value t, so
Jτ (c) = 14/24 ≈ 0.58.
Conditional degrees of justification which hold relative to a certain back-
ground knowledge can be defined as follows, making use of the concept of a
conditionally coherent position.
Definition 11 (Conditional degree of justification) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉
be a dialectical structure, and P ,B be two partial positions on τ . The condi-
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tional degree of justification of P relative to B in τ is
Jτ (P|B) = σPB
σB
,
where σB is the number of all complete positions on τ which are dialectically
coherent conditional to B, and σPB is the number of those complete positions
which are dialectically coherent conditional to B and which extend P.
For sentences p, q, we define Jτ (p|q) := Jτ (P|Q) where P ,Q are partial
positions which assign but p, respectively q, the truth value t.
Assume that, in example 1, p3 and p4 belong to our background knowl-
edge. How does this affect c’s (conditional) degree of justification? We define
a partial position B on {p3, p4} with B(p3) = B(p4) = t. As can be verified
with table 1, there are three positions which are dialectically coherent con-
ditional to B, namely P1,P5,P15; c is true in two of these. So
Jτ (c|B) = 2/3 ≈ 0.67.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein made a suggestion how strict entailment
can be generalised to the concept of degree of partial entailment (cf. proposi-
tion 5.15). The basic idea, which has later been seized by Carnap to develop
his inductive logic (Carnap, 1950), is depicted in figure 1 and can be put, in
abstract terms, like this. A sentence e implies a sentence h if and only if all
‘cases’ in which e is true are also cases in which h holds, i.e. the e-cases are
included in the h-cases (panel (a) of figure 1). Given, however, that not all,
but still most e-cases are h-cases, e does not imply h, but—that is essentially
the proposal—e ‘almost’ implies h. Or: e implies h to the extent that the
e-cases are included in the h-cases. And this, in turn, is expressed by the
ratio of h&e-cases over all e-cases (panel (b) of figure 1). That ratio is the
degree of partial entailment of h by e.
Carnap implemented this idea by interpreting ‘cases’ as so-called state-
descriptions. In the context of the theory of dialectical structures, however,
cases can be identified with dialectically coherent positions on some τ . This
yields the following definition of the degree of partial entailment in a dialec-
tical structure.
Definition 12 (Degree of partial entailment) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a
dialectical structure and P1,P2 be two partial positions on τ . The degree
of partial entailment of P1 by P2 in τ is
Iτ (P1|P2) = σP1P2
σP2
,
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e
h
e
h
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Degree of partial entailment. Adapted from Carnap (1950, p. 297).
where σP2 is the number of all dialectically coherent, complete positions on τ
which extend P2, and σP1P2 is the number of dialectically coherent, complete
positions which extend P1 and P2.
Let us calculate the degree of partial entailment of c by p4 in example 1.
Thence, we have two partial positions defined on one sentence each, C(c) = t,
and P(p4) = t. There are 10 dialectically coherent, complete positions that
extend P (namely P1,P3,P5,P7,P10,P13,P15,P17,P20,P23). Six of these ex-
tend C, too (namely P1,P3,P5,P7,P10,P13). Thus,
Iτ (C|P) = 6/10 = 0.6.
Before we investigate general properties of the degree of justification, we
note that degrees of justification and degrees of partial entailment closely
correspond to each other, as follows directly from the above definitions. Let
τ be a dialectical structure and let P1,P2 be two partial positions on τ , then:
1. Jτ (P1) = Iτ (P1|N ), and
2. Jτ (P1|P2) = Iτ (P1|P2).
In other words, degrees of partial entailment are nothing but conditional
degrees of justification, and we shall use, in the following, Jτ (. . . | . . .) to refer
to these.
4 General properties of degrees of justifica-
tion
This section investigates some general, ‘dynamic’ properties of degrees of
justification. It addresses the question how degrees of justification change
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when new arguments are introduced into a debate. As we seem to have
some clear intuitions regarding this matter (e.g., introducing new supporting
arguments for p does not decrease p’s degree of justification), this will allow
us to see whether the concept of degree of justification as defined in the
previous section fits to these pre-theoretic intuitions.
The following proposition states how a thesis’ degree of justification changes
when new and independent arguments which directly support or attack that
thesis are introduced. An argument is independent given some dialectical
structure τ iff none of its premisses is equivalent or contradictory to a sen-
tence that figures in τ .
Proposition 1 (Direct support and attack) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉, τ ′ =
〈T ′, A′, U ′〉 be two dialectical structures where τ ′ is obtained by introducing
a new, independent argument a into τ , T ′ = T ∪ {a}. Thesis t ∈ T states
sentence p.
1. If a→t, then Jτ ′(p) > Jτ (p).
2. If a t, then Jτ ′(p) < Jτ (p).
Proof: Assume a→t. Let σ (σ′) denote the number of all dialectically co-
herent, complete positions on τ (τ ′), and σp (σ′p) the number of dialectically
coherent, complete positions on τ (τ ′) corresponding to which p is true. Now,
consider an arbitrary dialectically coherent, complete position P on τ cor-
responding to which p is true. Because argument a is assumed to be inde-
pendent, and because its conclusion is true in P , any truth value assignment
to its premisses will extend P to a dialectically coherent, complete position
on τ ′. If a has n premisses, there will be 2n dialectically coherent, complete
position on τ ′ which extend P . As a next step, consider an arbitrary dialec-
tically coherent, complete position Q on τ corresponding to which p is false.
Those and only those truth value assignments to premisses of a according
to which not all premisses are true will extend Q to a dialectically coher-
ent, complete position on τ ′. So, there will be 2n − 1 dialectically coherent,
complete position on τ ′ which extend Q. According to lemma 1, every di-
alectically coherent, complete position on τ ′ extends a dialectically coherent,
complete position on τ . Hence, we can calculate the number of positions on
τ ′ as follows:
σ′p = 2
n · σp
(σ′ − σ′p) = (2n − 1) · (σ − σp).
Therefore:
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Jτ ′(p) =
σ′p
σ′
=
σ′p
(σ′ − σ′p) + σ′p
=
2n · σp
(2n − 1) · (σ − σp) + 2n · σp
=
2n · σp
2n · σ − (σ − σp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
2n · σp
2n · σ
= Jτ (p).
For symmetrical reasons, Jτ ′(p) < Jτ (p) if a t. 
The next proposition describes the effect of indirect attacks and supports,
e.g. the effect of supporting an argument which itself supports the central
thesis of a debate.
Proposition 2 (Indirect support and attack) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉, τ ′ =
〈T ′, A′, U ′〉 be two dialectical structures. a ∈ T is an independent argument
in τ , and τ ′ is obtained by introducing a further independent argument b into
τ , T ′ = T ∪ {b}. Thesis t ∈ T states sentence p.
1. If a→t and b→a, then Jτ ′(p) > Jτ (p).
2. If a→t and b a, then Jτ ′(p) < Jτ (p).
3. If a t and b→a, then Jτ ′(p) < Jτ (p).
4. If a t and b a, then Jτ ′(p) > Jτ (p).
Proof: We calculate to how many different dialectically coherent, complete
positions on τ ′ the respective positions on τ can be extended. (In this proof,
all positions are understood to be dialectically coherent and complete.) We
shall assume that a contains n premisses, and b contains m premisses. Con-
sider the first case, i.e. a→t and b→a, and let q be the conclusion of b (and
therefore a premiss of a). Since a is independent in τ , the ratio of (i) positions
on τ according to which p and q are true over (ii) positions on τ according to
which p is true but q is false equals 2n−1 : 2n−1. This is because all 2n truth
value assignments to a’s premisses satisfy the coherence constraint if a’s con-
clusion, p, is true, and q is true in exactly half of these. Yet, if a’s conclusion
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is false, there is one truth value assignment to its premisses which will not
figure in a position on τ , namely the one which considers all premisses true.
So, in that case, there are only 2n−1 corresponding truth value assignments,
2n−1 of which regard q as false and 2n−1 − 1 take q as true. The ratio of (i)
positions on τ according to which p is false and q is true over (ii) positions
on τ according to which p and q are false equals therefore 2n−1 − 1 : 2n−1.
Every position on τ with true q can be extended to 2m different positions
on τ ′. In other words, the positions with true q are multiplied by 2m when
introducing b. Still, a position on τ with false q can only be extended to
2m − 1 different positions on τ ′.
Given (a) the ratio of positions on τ with p and q true over positions with
p true and q false, and (b) the respective multipliers, the number of positions
on τ with p true is multiplied by the following factor when introducing b:
m1 =
2n−1 · 2m + 2n−1 · (2m − 1)
2n
.
Likewise, the number of positions on τ with p false is multiplied by the
following factor when introducing b:
m2 =
(2n−1 − 1) · 2m + 2n−1 · (2m − 1)
2n − 1
=
2n−1 · 2m + 2n−1 · (2m − 1)− 2m+2m
2
2n − 1
<
2n−1 · 2m + 2n−1 · (2m − 1)− 2m+(2m−1)
2
2n − 1
=
2n−1 · 2m + 2n−1 · (2m − 1)
2n
= m1.
So the number of positions on τ with p true is multiplied by a greater
factor than the number of positions with p false, and that is why p’s degree
of justification increases when introducing b.
We will briefly consider the second case, that is a→t and b a. (Cases (3)
and (4) hold for analogous reasons.) Let ¬q be the conclusion of b. The ratios
of positions on τ as calculated in the first case do apply. Yet, because b a, a
position on τ with q true can be extended to 2m− 1 different positions on τ ′.
Every position on τ with q false yields 2m positions on τ ′ when introducing
b. This implies for the corresponding factors m2 and m1:
m2 =
(2n−1 − 1) · (2m − 1) + 2n−1 · 2m
2n − 1
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=
2n−1 · (2m − 1) + 2n−1 · 2m − (2m−1)+(2m−1)
2
2n − 1
>
2n−1 · (2m − 1) + 2n−1 · 2m − (2m−1)+2m
2
2n − 1
=
2n−1 · (2m − 1) + 2n−1 · (2m)
2n
= m1.
Thus, a position in τ with p false can be extended to, on average, more
positions in τ ′ than a position in τ with p true. As a consequence, p’s degree
of justification decreases when introducing b. 
These tedious proofs have provided results that seem to correspond to our
intuitions and argumentative practice: Introducing an argument that directly
supports t, backing an argument which supports t, or introducing a counter-
argument against an attack on t represent argumentative moves commonly
carried out in order to underpin or defend t. All these strategies increase t’s
degree of justification. Likewise, one puts forward a direct challenge against t,
backs an argument which attacks t, or introduces a counter-argument against
a support for t with a view to undercutting t. Those moves actually diminish
t’s degree of justification.
Propositions 1 and 2 describe, qualitatively, into which direction a thesis’
degree of justification changes due to a certain modification of the dialectical
structure. These findings, however, didn’t tell whether it is more effective, in
terms of the quantitative impact on the degree of justification, to (i) support
a thesis directly or to (ii) support a supporting argument, for example. In
order to be able to judge the effectiveness of different argumentative moves,
I carried out a small simulation study whose results will be reported in the
remainder of this section. Besides investigating the quantitative effectiveness
of different argumentative moves, that study allows us to analyse degrees of
justification in more complex dialectical structures.
The study aimed at comparing four different argumentative strategies: (a)
direct support, (b) indirect support, (c) direct attack, (d) indirect attack.
I have simulated four corresponding, stylised debates which consist in the
successive construction of the dialectical patterns depicted in figure 2. The
ten arguments of each debate, a1, . . . , a10, are introduced consecutively and
at each step, the degree of justification of the thesis t is recalculated so as to
measure the marginal effect of the last argument put forward. The arguments
contain three premisses each while no sentence figures as premiss in two
different arguments. Thence, the final states contain 31 sentences (ignoring
negations), and 231 ≈ 109 positions have to be checked for coherency, making
computer help indispensable.
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Figure 2: Final states of four stylised debates.
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The left-hand panel of figure 3 depicts how t’s degree of justification
changes during the successive construction of the four dialectical patterns. In
both fan-argumentations, the degree of justification increases (green), respec-
tively decreases (red), continuously and monotonically in course of the argu-
mentation process, as expected. Red and green fan-argumentation, moreover,
behave symmetrically: After the final argument, a10, has been introduced, we
have Jgreen fan(t) = 0.79 and Jred fan(t) = 0.21. If the fan-argumentations were
continued, degrees of justification would converge against 1 and 0 in the long
run. As a consequence, the marginal effectiveness of direct supporting and
attacking arguments decreases. This effect becomes already apparent after 10
steps: While a1 changed the degree of justification by 3.3 points, a10 merely
caused a modification of 2.3 points. The row-argumentations, however, give
rise to a more complicated picture. In the green row-argumentation, t’s
degree of justification changes hardly any more after a few steps; from a6
on, the first 10 decimal places remain constant. So, marginal effectiveness
decreases much more drastically than in the green fan. Still, while every
additional argument increases the degree of justification in the green row,
the degree of justification follows a zigzag line for the red row, as a closer
look reveals (right-hand panel of figure 3). The first attack, a1, reduces
t’s degree of justification, the counter-attack, a2, increases it, the counter-
counter-attack decreases it, etc. etc. But here, as in the green row, the
marginal effectiveness of additional arguments decreases dramatically, too.
In both row-argumentations, degrees of justification have changed, after 10
steps, from an initial value of 0.5 to 0.54, respectively 0.47, only. In sum, this
simulation suggests that the effectiveness of additional arguments in terms
of impact on a thesis’ degree of justification decreases significantly with its
distance to t.
5 Degrees of justification are probabilities
This caption is in need of a qualification. It is misleading to say that condi-
tional degrees of justification are probabilities, full stop. To see this, consider
the following dialectical structure.
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Figure 3: Degrees of justification of t (y-axis) in stylised debates as function
of arguments introduced (x-axis). (a) green fan: Gruener Strauss; (b) green
row: Gruene Kette; (c) red fan: Roter Strauss; (d) red row: Rote Kette.
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Assume that sentences p1 and p2 are logically incompatible. Conse-
quently, according to probability calculus, P (p1) + P (p2) = P (p1 ∨ p2). Yet,
as is obvious for reasons of symmetry, Jτ (p1) = Jτ (p2) = Jτ (p1 ∨ p2). There-
fore, it appears, degrees of justification aren’t probabilities. The underlying
problem which gives rise to this and similar counter-examples is that the log-
ical relations between p1, p2, and p1∨p2 are not represented in the dialectical
structure, and therefore not taken into account when calculating degrees of
justification.
We will address and account for this problem as follows. First of all, we
show that degrees of justification of partial positions are probabilities. On the
basis of this result, we demonstrate that degrees of justification of single sen-
tences can be identified with degrees of justification of partial positions under
specific conditions, namely insofar as the inferential relations referred to in
the probability statements are fully represented in the dialectical structure.
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The concept of degree of justification hence yields a further interpretation
of the formal, mathematical probability theory—additional to the logical,
subjective, frequency, and propensity interpretation of probability.
In addition to the connective introduced in definition 4, which imme-
diately allows us to calculate the degree of justification of the conjunctive
combination of two positions, we have to define the degree of justification of
the disjunctive combination of two positions. Although there is, generally,
no single position which corresponds to the disjunction of two positions, the
definition of the respective degree of justification is straightforward.
Definition 13 (Degree of justification of disjunction of positions) Let
τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical structure, and let P1, P2 represent two partial
positions on τ . The degree of justification of the disjunction of these two
positions is defined as,
Jτ (P1 ∨ P2) = σP1∨P2
σ
,
where σP1∨P2 refers to the number of coherent and complete positions on τ
which extend P1 or P2 (or both).
Conditional degrees of justification of such disjunctions are defined cor-
respondingly.
With respect to this definition, we can now show,
Proposition 3 (Degrees of justification are probabilities) Degrees of
justification satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms.
Proof: Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical structure. We have to show,
(i) 0 ≤ Jτ (P) ≤ 1 for every position P ,
(ii) Jτ (Ω) = 1 for every τ -certain position Ω,
(iii) Jτ (P1∨P2) = Jτ (P1) +Jτ (P2) for two τ -exclusive positions P1 and P2.
Ad (i): Clear, because every degree of justification is by definition greater
than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1. Ad (ii): Let Ω be a τ -certain
position. Therefore, as σΩ = σ,
Jτ (ω) =
σω
σ
= 1.
Ad (iii): The number of coherent and complete positions which extend P1
or P2 equals the number of coherent and complete positions which extend
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P1 plus the number of coherent and complete positions which extend P2
minus—accounting for double-count—the number of coherent and complete
positions which extend both P1 and P2, i.e. which extend P1&P2. Thus,
since P1 and P2 are τ -exclusive,
Jτ (P1 ∨ P2) = σ(P1∨P2)
σ
=
σP1 + σP2 −
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
σP1P2
σ
=
σP1
σ
+
σP2
σ
= Jτ (P1) + Jτ (P2).

Moreover, degrees of partial entailment are conditional probabilities, as
the following proposition states.
Proposition 4 (Conditional probabilities) Degrees of partial entailment
are conditional probabilities.
Proof: Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical structure. We have to show that
Jτ (P|Q) = Jτ (P&Q)/Jτ (Q) for arbitrary P , Q. Yet this is simple,
Jτ (P|Q) = σPQ
σQ
=
σ(P&Q)
σQ
=
σ(P&Q)/σ
σQ/σ
=
Jτ (P&Q)
Jτ (Q) .

Let us reconsider the problem initially raised in this section. When do
degrees of justification of single sentences satisfy the Kolmogorov axioms?
This would clearly be the case if degrees of justification of partial positions
and single sentences suitably agreed—specifically, if Jτ (p ∧ q) = Jτ (P&Q)
and Jτ (p ∨ q) = Jτ (P ∨ Q), where P and Q denote partial positions which
assign but p and q the value t. This condition is obviously violated in the
example considered at the beginning of this section. Thus, for instance, not
every position according to which p1 is true or p2 is true considers p1∨p2 true,
as well. Still, the following theorem states that every dialectical structure
may be easily extended by simple arguments so that degrees of justification
of single sentences agree with the degrees of justification of the corresponding
partial positions.
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Proposition 5 (Single sentence degrees of justification) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉
be a dialectical structure and p, q, p∨q, p∨q ∈ S be four sentences in τ . P and
Q denote partial positions that assign exactly one truth value and according
to which p, respectively q, is true. Then, it is always possible to introduce
additional, valid arguments into τ without introducing new sentences so that
Jτ (p ∧ q) = Jτ (P&Q) and Jτ (p ∨ q) = Jτ (P ∨Q).
Proof: The stated equations hold if
• E is a coherent extension of P&Q iff E(p ∧ q) = t, and
• E is a coherent extension of P or of Q iff E(p ∨ q) = t.
In order to guarantee these two conditions, it suffices to introduce the valid
arguments (p, q; p ∧ q), (p ∧ q; p), (p ∧ q; q), (p; p ∨ q), (q; p ∨ q), (p ∨ q,
¬p; q), (p∨ q, ¬q; p). The coherence constraints imposed by these additional
arguments make sure that (1) p∧ q is true in E iff p is true and q is true, and
(2) p ∨ q is true in E iff p is true or q is true. 
So, what do these three propositions signify? First of all, we have not
proven that degrees of justification represent the probability of a certain the-
sis being true. All we have shown is that degrees of justification realise, or
are a model of, a certain mathematical structure. What makes this result sig-
nificant is that the respective mathematical structure—probability theory—
is so well known and that the theorems of probability theory as well as the
probability calculus can all at once be applied to degrees of justification.
6 Degrees of justification and dialectical en-
tailment
This section investigates how the concepts of degree of justification and de-
gree of partial entailment relate to the notion of dialectical entailment, in
particular to the concept of τ -deducibility. In order to express that a sen-
tence follows from other sentences given the inferential relations encoded in
a certain dialectical structure, Betz (2009) defined τ -deducibility as follows:
Definition 14 (τ-deducibility) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be given. A statement
c is deducible in τ from P = {p1 . . . pn}, briefly “P `τ c”, iff there is an
argument a ∈ T with conclusion c and there is a green, acyclic subgraph
τ ′ ⊆ τ such that (i) a is the only sink of τ ′, and (ii) Πτ ′ ⊆ P .
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Here, Πτ ′ refers to the free premisses in the green subgraph τ
′, i.e. the set
of premisses which are not equivalent with the conclusion of an argument in
τ ′.
Example 1 is a green, acyclic dialectical structure whose only sink is t.
Its free premisses, Π, include p2, p3, p4. So, relative to example 1, c is τ -
deducible from these, {p2, p3, p4} `τ c. Moreover, let P and C denote the
partial positions which consider p2, p3, p4, respectively c true. As there is no
dialectically coherent, complete position Q which extends P and C, we have
σCP = σP , and thence the degree of partial entailment of c by p2, p3, p4 is:
Jτ (C|P) = σCP
σP
= 1.
This observation can be generalised. If P `τ c on some dialectical struc-
ture τ and if the partial position P which considers sentences in P as true
is coherent at all (otherwise the degree of partial entailment would not be
defined), then Jτ (c|P) = 1. This is due to the fact that every complete posi-
tion on a green, acyclic subgraph which considers its free premisses true, has
to consider its conclusions true in order to be dialectically coherent.
However, the reverse does not hold in general. Consider:
Example 3
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Here, ¬p1 is clearly not τ -deducible from {c, p2}. There is, however,
no dialectically coherent, complete position which considers p1, p2, c true in
the same time. In other words, ¬p1 is true according to every dialectically
coherent, complete position which extends the partial position P defined on
{c, p2} with P(c) = P(p2) = t. Thus, we have Jτ (¬p1|P) = 1.
Cases like example 3 seem to pinpoint a disadvantage of the concept
of τ -deducibility. For doesn’t it make perfectly sense to say that, given the
inferential relations encoded in the dialectical structure, c and p2 imply ¬p1—
although there is no corresponding green subgraph? The inadequacy of the
purely formal, syntactic concept of τ -deducibility motivates the introduction
of a semantic notion of dialectical entailment.
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Definition 15 (Dialectic-semantic entailment) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be given.
A statement c is dialectic-semantically entailed in τ by P = {p1 . . . pn},
briefly “P |=τ c”, iff every dialectically coherent, complete position on τ which
extends P also extends C; where P , C are partial positions with P(p1) = . . . =
P(pn) = t and C(c) = t.
It follows immediately from this definition that P |=τ c ⇐⇒ Jτ (c|P) =
1. In particular, regarding example 3, we have {c, p2} |=τ ¬p1.
Inasmuch as the notion of dialectic-semantic entailment seems to rectify
certain shortcomings of the concept of τ -deducibility, it seems to be advisable
to replace, in a theory of dialectical structures, the latter by the former. This
means, specifically, to reformulate discursive aims such as fulfilling burdens
of proof (cf. Betz, 2009, def. 8), in terms of dialectic-semantic entailment
rather than τ -deducibility.
7 Robustness
Having formally defined and explored the notion of degree of justification,
we shall now, based on the precise explication, step back and ask what that
notion actually signifies. What does it tell us about a debate? What precisely
can we infer from a thesis’ degree of justification being rather high, or low,
in a certain dialectical structure?
In order to answer these questions, it is helpful to recall the vague, intu-
itive idea the previous sections tried to explicate: The question “How well
is this-and-this thesis justified?” has been rephrased as “What would have
to be the case such that this thesis were false?”, thence expressing the idea
that the fewer positions there are in debate according to which t is false, the
higher t’s degree of justification. This general idea already reveals that one
enters a fundamentally different mode of debate evaluation when one inspects
a thesis’ degree of justification as compared to asking, for example, whether
a single, specific position is dialectically coherent, or who carries a burden of
proof. Calculating degrees of justification presupposes considering all posi-
tions that can be coherently adopted in a debate, and presupposes, moreover,
to regard them as equal (in some sense). To put it differently, calculating
degrees of justification involves adopting a view from nowhere on a certain
debate. This mode of evaluation starkly contrasts with the debate evaluation
as set out in Betz (2009), which is basically debate evaluation from specific
perspectives: The latter puts the focus on evaluating single positions in a
debate, examining, in particular, whether the proponent’s position is coher-
ent, and whether the proponent carries a burden of proof. More specifically,
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the fact that introducing an argument a increases t’s degree of justification
neither indicates that doing so is an effective strategy to foster the discursive
aims of a proponent who claims t, nor does a discursive strategy which helps
a proponent to defend t necessarily increase t’s degree of justification. In
order to see that, consider the following two fictitious examples.
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In example 4, Anna claims q which is attacked by two arguments, both
including p as premiss. Anna holds that p which is also a premiss of further
arguments in her subdebate. Putting forward an argument b which concludes
that ¬p apparently increases Jτ (q), yet is not available as an option for Anna
who would contradict herself.
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Barbara, in example 5, claims q. Her thesis, though, is attacked by an
argument a1 which starts from premiss p. That very premiss is also used in
two arguments that support q, a2 and a3, but which Barbara does not adopt
because she rejects some of their premisses. In this situation, Barbara effec-
tively defends her thesis by attacking p with argument b. Yet, introducing
the argument b decreases q’s degree of justification.
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These clarifications might make one wonder whether degrees of justifica-
tion are of any significance at all. Of what avail is the view from nowhere?
In the end, everybody is someone—not no one in particular; everybody is
somehow, somewhere located in a debate—not nowhere. Isn’t debate eval-
uation which considers specific perspectives and positions all we ultimately
want and need?
So should we refrain from giving an interpretation of degrees of justifi-
cation which says more than that they indicate the relative proportion of
coherent positions in which the thesis is true? If one affirms this question,
those parts of our intuitive notion of strength of justification which have
been successfully captured by the theoretical concept of degree of justifi-
cation would only have a minor role to play in debate evaluation. More
dramatically, we would not be able to explain why one should belief in a
thesis which is well justified: rational belief would have nothing to do with
degree of justification. This would, at least, be puzzling. Thence, in the re-
mainder of this section, I am going to discuss how the gap between rational
belief and degree of justification might be bridged.
I see two similar explanations for why it is rational to believe sentences
with high degree of justification: (a) because believing a partial position with
a higher degree of justification provides one with more future alternatives re-
garding the extension of one’s position, and (b) because a partial position
with a higher degree of justification is more immune to falsification. Both
explanations stress that well justified partial positions are more robust; and
both take off from the same starting point: Consider a dialectically coherent
partial position P on some τ . P might represent the entire position a propo-
nent has so far adopted in a debate, or it might delineate the core position
of a proponent, i.e. those truth value assignments she is resolved to hold
on to, come what may. The question is: Why should a rational proponent
be interested in Jτ (P) being high? First of all, recall that a high degree of
justification signifies that there are many dialectically coherent, complete po-
sitions in τ to which P can be extended. In contrast, the lower the degree of
justification, the less dialectically coherent, complete positions on τ extend
P . In the extreme, there will be but one dialectically coherent, complete
position that extends P ; and in that case, P , although possibly defined on a
small subset of τ ’s sentences only, determines the truth values of all sentences
in τ .
Explanation (a) urges us to picture a proponent who is constructing her
position on τ step by step, and who has thus far adopted P . Now such a pro-
ponent might be interested in P having a high degree of justification because
that minimises her current commitment to future truth value assignments.
Recent results in decision theory substantiate this point. Thus, Rosenhead
26
(2001) argues that “robustness” is, in general, an adequate decision princi-
ple when “there is radical uncertainty about the future, and where decisions
can or must be staged sequentially” (p. 181). As the proponent builds up
her position (from a certain basis) stepwise and hardly knows what to think
about theses she hasn’t considered in detail yet, both conditions, in a cer-
tain sense, apply in our case. If we say that “an acceptable configuration”
which is “reachable” corresponds to, in our case, a complete and dialectically
coherent position which extends P , the following definition of the so-called
robustness score boils down to the degree of justification:
The robustness of any of the candidate initial commitments un-
der consideration can then be defined as the ratio of the number
of acceptable configurations that are ‘reachable’ from that com-
mitment, to the total number of configurations which have been
identified as having acceptable expected performance at the plan-
ning horizon. (Rosenhead, 2001, p. 189)
Why, then, is it rational to believe in theses with higher degree of justification
rather than in theses with lower one? It is rational to do so when completing
one’s own partial position over a dialectical structure because:
1. It is rational to adopt a dialectically coherent, complete position.
2. It is rational to maximise future options when taking sequential deci-
sions under uncertainty.
This is the first suggestion how the gap between rational belief and de-
gree of justification can be bridged. The second explanation (b) stresses
that partial positions with higher degree of justification are more immune
to falsification. Assume that P represents the core beliefs of a proponent.
Now if Jτ (P) is very low, truth values of most sentences in the debate are
determined by P and, therefore, fixing a truth value of some sentence in τ ,
i.e. the growth or modification of the background knowledge, risks rendering
the entire partial position (conditionally) incoherent. So, if Jτ (P) is very
low, the proponent is inflexible and runs the risk that a single commitment
(outside her core position) forces her to modify her core position. If, however,
Jτ (P) is high, the proponent’s core position can be coherently combined with
many different truth value assignments, the position is flexible and robust
against future growth and modification of the background knowledge, it is
immune to falsification. This is the second reason why a rational proponent
is interested in adopting a partial position with high degree of justification.
Although this reasoning explains to which extent it is rational to adopt a
position with high degree of justification, it should be noted, as a caveat, that
27
it is not unreasonable to adopt a position with low degree of justification in
the same sense as it would be unreasonable to adopt a dialectically incoherent
position. A proponent who adopts an incoherent position contradicts herself.
This is not true for a proponent who adopts a position with low degree of
justification. Such a position can still be coherent (unless Jτ (P) = 0). And it
might be perfectly rational—e.g. because the proponent is eager to maintain
certain theses—to adopt it.
8 Conclusion
This paper defined and investigated the quantitative concept of a thesis’
degree of justification. That concept explicates our intuitive, comparative
notion of strength of justification—a notion we tried to trace by the fol-
lowing, paradigmatic question: What would have to be the case, given the
corresponding dialectical structure and body of background knowledge, such
that the thesis were actually false? The theoretic concept turned out to fit
to our pre-theoretic intuitions, since what typically counts as a support and
defence of (attack on) a thesis, actually increases (decreases) its degree of
justification. Moreover, the concept of degree of justification has been re-
lated to other notions of the theory of dialectical structures, in particular
to τ -deducibility, and it has been shown to satisfy the axioms of probability
theory.
The last section discussed the significance of degrees of justification. I
suggested that the apparent gap between rational belief and degree of justifi-
cation can be bridged with a view to the property of being a robust position.
High degree of justification implies high robustness, and this, in turn, en-
sures that a partial position (a) can be flexibly extended in many different
ways when constructing a complete position, and (b) is highly immune to
falsification.
A Appendix: Dialectically coherent positions
and complete, closed subdebates in equi-
librium
Before we relate the notion of a dialectically coherent position to the concept
of a complete, closed subdebate in equilibrium, I repeat, without comment,
the relevant definitions from Betz (2009).
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Definition 16 (Validity-function) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical struc-
ture. A function v : T → {0, 1} is called a validity-function on τ iff for all
a ∈ T : (v(a) = 0↔ ∃b ∈ T : b a ∧ v(b) = 1)).
If the validity-function exists on τ and is unique, it is labelled “ϑ” and an
argument a ∈ T is called “τ -valid” iff ϑ(a) = 1, “τ -invalid” otherwise.
Definition 17 (Free premiss) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be given. A premiss p of
an argument in τ is called “bound in τ” iff
∃a ∈ T :
[
ϑ(a) = 1 ∧
(
(p⇔ C(a)) ∨ (p⇔ ¬C(a))
)]
.
If and only if a premiss is not bound in τ , it is “free in τ”. The set of all
free premisses of τ is called Πτ .
Definition 18 (Equilibrium) A dialectical structure τ = 〈T,A, U〉 is said
to be in equilibrium iff not
(p ∈ Πτ ∨ Πτ `τ p) ∧ (¬p ∈ Πτ ∨ Πτ `τ ¬p)
for some sentence p.
Definition 19 (Stance-attribution) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉, and O = {o1, . . . , ok}
be a set of proponents. A function S : O → P(T ) which assigns each propo-
nent a subset Ti ⊆ T is called a stance-attribution on τ . τi = 〈S(oi), A|S(oi), U |S(oi)〉
is the subdebate accepted by oi. A proponent oi claims that
• All p ∈ Πτi are true.
• All C(a) (with a ∈ S(oi) is τi-valid) are true.
Definition 20 (Closed subdebates) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical
structure and S : O → P(T ) a stance-attribution on τ . A subdebate τi in-
duced by S is called “closed” iff there is no a ∈ (T \ Ti) such that Πτi = Πτ ′,
τ ′ = 〈S(oi) ∪ {a}, A|S(oi)∪{a}, U |S(oi)∪{a}〉.
Betz (2009) stipulated that a subdebate has to be complete in order
to represent a position a proponent can rationally adopt in a debate, for
otherwise the status assignment might not even exist on her subdebate. The
following attempt to relate the concept of a coherent position (as truth value
assignment) and the notion of a closed, complete subdebate in equilibrium
will show that subdebates have to satisfy an additional condition in order
to represent rational positions: for each sentence whose negation occurs in
the debate as well, the proponent has to assert exactly one of both in a
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thesis. As the completeness condition already required that specific theses
exist in a dialectical structure, I propose to modify and extend the definition
of a complete stance-attribution as follows instead of introducing a further
condition.
Definition 21 (Complete stance-attribution) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a
dialectical structure. The stance-attribution S : {o1, . . . , ok} → P(T ) is called
“complete” iff for every induced subdebate τi (i = 1 . . . k) there is a τi-valid
thesis t ∈ Ti stating either p or ¬p
1. for every pair of contradictory sentences p,¬p which both occur in τ
while neither p nor ¬p occurs in τi,
2. for every conclusion p of a τi-invalid argument which neither attacks
nor supports another argument in τi, and
3. for every red circle C in τi such that
(a) t attacks one of C’s arguments,
(b) t is neither part of a red circle itself nor connected to a red circle
via a red directed path from that circle to aC, and
(c) t is assigned the validity value 1 according to a partial evaluation
of τi, ϑpartial, which excludes all arguments in red circles.
As a final preliminary concept, we introduce
Definition 22 (Generated v-function) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉 be a dialectical
structure and Q be a complete position on τ . A function v : T → {0, 1} is
generated by Q iff for every argument a ∈ T with premisses p1, . . . , pn:
v(a) = 1 ⇐⇒ Q(p1) = . . .Q(pn) = t.
v is called a v-function.
With these definitions at hand, we can now proof
Proposition 6 (Construction of dialectically coherent position) Let S :
{o1, . . . , ok} → P(T ) be a complete stance-attribution on the dialectical struc-
ture τ = 〈T,A, U〉. If the induced subdebate τi is closed, in equilibrium, and
the validity function ϑ exists on τi, then there is a dialectically coherent,
complete position Q on τ such that for the v-function v which is generated
by Q:
∀a ∈ T : v(a) = 1 ⇐⇒ ϑ(a) = 1.
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Proof: Let Πτi denote the set of free premisses of τi. We construct Q on
τi first, show that Q|τi satisfies the coherence constraints on τi, and then
proceed by extending Q to those sentences that do not occur in τi.
Step 1: We set for every sentence p that occurs in τi
Q(p) :=
{
t p ∈ Πτi ∨ ∃a ∈ Ti : [(p↔ C(a)) ∧ ϑ(a) = 1]
f otherwise
To see that Q|τi assigns complementary truth values to contradictory sen-
tences (constraint 2 in definition 5), consider p, q with q ↔ ¬p occurring in
τi. If p is a τi-free premiss or the conclusion of a τi-valid argument, then
q is not because τi is in equilibrium and thence Q(p) = t,Q(q) = f . If, in
contrast, both p and q are neither τi-free premisses nor conclusions of τi-valid
arguments, then both are conclusions of τi-invalid arguments only. Yet as
τi is complete, there are no pairs of contradictory sentences which are but
conclusions τi-invalid arguments. So the second case does not arise. We still
have to show that Q|τi assigns conclusions the value t if the corresponding
premisses are true (constraint 3 in definition 5): If for all premisses p1 . . . pn
of some a ∈ Ti it holds that Q(p1) = . . . = Q(pn) = t, then a is by construc-
tion not attacked by any τi-valid argument—τi would not be in equilibrium
otherwise—, and therefore Q(C(a)) = t.
Step 2: We extend Q to τ \ τi as follows (note that we consider sentences
that do occur in τ but not in τi): Every sentence p whose negation occurs
in τi is assigned the complementary truth value to Q(¬p). Every remaining
sentence is set to f . Now, let us complete the check for dialectical coherency.
Let p, q be two contradictory sentences, not both in τi (if one of both is in τi
the construction ensures that they are assigned complementary truth values).
But by completeness of S, there is a thesis in τi that states either p or q,
and therefore the construction guarantees Q(p) and Q(q) are complementary.
Next, does Q satisfy the ‘deduction constraint’ (constraint 3 in definition 5)?
The first thing to note is that every argument a ∈ τ \ τi contains at least
one premiss which is false. For otherwise, every premiss p of a were either
(i) a τi-free premiss in τi, (ii) a conclusion of a τi-valid argument, or (iii)
the negation of a sentence in τi that is neither (i) nor (ii). Yet, since by
completeness of S the only sentences in τi that are neither (i) nor (ii) are
negations of conclusions of τi-valid arguments, (iii) amounts to being the
conclusion of a τi-valid argument, i.e. (ii). Hence τi would not be a closed
subdebate. Now because every argument a in τ \ τi has at least one false
premiss, Q satisfies the deduction constraint. Also, this fact guarantees that
v(a) = 0. 
The final proposition tells us how to construct a closed subdebate in
equilibrium which corresponds to a given dialectically coherent, complete
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position.
Proposition 7 (Construction of stance-attribution) Let τ = 〈T,A, U〉
be a dialectical structure and v a v-function that is generated by a dialecti-
cally coherent, complete position Q on τ . There exists a stance-attribution
S : {o} → P(T ) inducing the subdebate τo such that
1. v is a validity function on τo,
2. τo is in equilibrium,
3. τo is closed.
Proof: First, we construct τo iteratively. Let T0 = ∅ and apply the following
rule provided Tn is given
(R) Let T ∗ be the set of all arguments a ∈ T \Tn such that for every premiss
p of a: Q(p) = t or p negates the conclusion of an argument b ∈ Tn with
v(b) = 1. If T ∗ = ∅ then To = Tn, STOP. Otherwise Tn+1 = Tn ∪ T ∗.
Ad 1): We show that ϑ : To → {0, 1} with a 7→ v(a) is a validity function
on τo. By construction an argument a ∈ To has a premiss p with Q(p) = f if
and only if there is an argument b which is τo-valid and attacks a. Thus, ϑ
does satisfy the recursive definition of a validity function.
Ad 2): Assume that τo were not in equilibrium, that is there were a
sentence p such that both p and ¬p are (i) a τo-free premiss or (ii) a conclusion
of a τo-valid argument. If p were a τo-free premiss in argument a, then
(by definition of “free premiss”) ¬p couldn’t be the conclusion of a τo-valid
argument. So ¬p would be a τo-free premiss in some argument b, too. Because
of dialectical coherency, Q(p) is complementary to Q(¬p), and thence the
algorithm would not have picked a and b. Yet if p were the conclusion of a
τo-valid argument, ¬p would not be τo-free and would thus be the conclusion
of a τo-valid argument, too. Still, this contradicts the assumption that Q is
dialectically coherent.
Ad 3): Assume there were an argument a ∈ T \ To such that adding a
to τo would not increase the set of τo-free premisses. Then every premiss of
a would either be (i) a τo-free premiss of some argument in To (and thus be
true), (ii) the conclusion of a τo-valid argument’s conclusion (and thus be
true), or (iii) the negation of a τo-valid argument’s conclusion. Therefore,
the rule (R) would have picked a and would not have stopped. 
So not only can we construct dialectically coherent, complete positions
from stance-attributions, but, inversely, every coherent position corresponds
to a closed subdebate in equilibrium. Note that such a subdebate is not
necessarily complete since the dialectical structure τ might simply not contain
enough theses.
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